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Chapter 1
Introduction
Governmental or legislative decision making – at any point in time and in any nation
in the world –  involves normative considerations. Normative, as opposed to positive
notions, are subjective and not necessarily based on facts. They are born of beliefs or
values  that  help  one  conclude  'what  ought  to  be'.  This  is  but  a  characteristic  of
humankind, whose members are participants of a social life,  whose ancestors have
experienced various colours of history and whose future socio-political realities are
given forethought. 
  In the case of  a  nation's  economy,  there is  also much consideration given to  the
understanding and knowledge produced in the field of economics. Theories, models,
methods of predictions and other scientific calculations act as tools or guidelines in the
process of formulating economic policies.
    However, a quick look at a popular media presents to us the vast non-economic
challenges  to  policy  making  with  regard to  social  justice  and 'fairness'.  At  various
points, one may also observe the influence of political parties and other social groups
on  the  content  of  the  decision-making  process  by  the  government.  This  certainly
suggests that economic policies are not made with theoretic concerns that arise from
economists alone, but pass through heavy discussions and real conversations between
the representatives of the State as well as the public. Rejoice! For this is the blessing of
a democratic society. 
    The purpose of this thesis concerns the study of economic philosophy – to enquire
about the role of ethical or normative values, such as human welfare, freedom and
social justice, in economic reasoning, particularly that which precedes an economic
policy  decision.  This  aspect  of  economic  philosophy  challenges  what  we  call  as
'rational', especially in the context of a democracy supported by a capitalistic economy,
featured by pluralism in both social and economic aspects. 
     For such an objective of the study, the process of taxation is chosen as a subject
through which I may explore the combinations of normative and economic ideas that
determine the structure as well as the continuation of fiscal policies in a nation-state.
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The research will  thus  explore important  philosophical  questions  in the context of
taxation  such  as:  What  is  the  role  of  the  State  in  ensuring  social  justice  through
taxation and provision of public goods? What normative values determine how much
an individual should pay? To what extent ought a government expand the size of the
public sector in an economy? To gain understanding regarding these concerns,  the
research will survey a range of secondary texts in order to collect and organize various
ideas and arguments by scholars from different standpoints in economic literature.
    The dissertation will  be divided into three main chapters.  First, 1.  An Enquiry
Through Normative  Values  –  a  review of  thoughts  regarding  the  role  of  the  State,
redistributive justice as well as various normative statements regarding criteria upon
which an individual's tax liability ought to be determined by. 2. An Enquiry Through
Economic  Concepts  –  an  analysis  of  the  various  economic  effects  of  taxations,
measured or evaluated by neoclassical economic concepts such as efficiency and tax
incidence which present the effects of a tax system in an economy and lastly 3. Views
on Public Finance – a study of some important arguments regarding the extent of a
government's control over a nation's wealth and the nature of public expenditure. 
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Chapter 2
An Enquiry Through Normative Values
2.1 Taxation as the collection of surplus
There  are  multiple  ways  through  which  one  can  view  the  economic  process  of
taxation:  a  collection  of  funds  for  the  administration  of  society,  a  method  to
systematically  reallocate  the  wealth  present  in  nations  or  a  democratic  means  of
redistributing  income,  given  that  Robin  Hood  and  his  Merry  Men1 are  no  longer
around. Whichever the perception, none are complete without the concept of surplus. 
    The term surplus was described fundamentally by Quesnay2 as the part of the social
product  (or  total  produce)  of  a  society  that remains  after  deducting the 'necessary
consumption' and can be disposed of  without compromising that society's survival.
Here  we  may  identify  three  known  values:  (1)  the  social  product  or  aggregate  of
commodities present in a given period, (2) real wages, or distribution to workers for
their subsistence and the replacement to the means of production, and (3) the total
number of workers employed. The product of the (2) and (3) represents the 'necessary
consumption'  which,  when deducted  from  (1)  gives  us  the  surplus  of  that  society.
Surplus is produced when the labour process(es)3 in a society is able to generate more
than is  required  to  maintain  the  workers  at  the  standard  of  living  that  is  context
appropriate (time and space) as well as to replace the capital used up in production.
This  surplus,  say  in  a  household,  may  be  saved  and  used  for  consumption  of
goods/services or  paid as tax to the government.  On a larger scale,  surplus can be
recognized as that part of a nation's total product which is at its free disposal.  
    The use of the surplus that is collected by a sovereign government often allows us to
evaluate the structure and evolution of that society. If it is reinvested in labour saving
1 Robin Hood is a fictional character found in English folklore dating back to the 15th century, a heroic outlaw, who with 
the help of his group of bandits “Merry Men”, would fight to rob the rich and give to the poor.
2 As elaborated by Garegnani, P.. (1984)
3 Labour processes can be identified using two elements – technology and social organization of production. While the 
former defines the relation between inputs and outputs, the latter describes the relation between people and the process 
of production itself; as understood from Bowles, S., Edwards, R., & Roosevelt, F. (1993). Understanding capitalism. 
Harper Collins College.
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technology,  we  may  predict  that  the  society  will  incur  some  increase  in  living
standards. If it is put to use in a specific sector, such as that of defence and nuclear
weapons, it may alter its global political position. But prior to discussing the use of the
surplus itself, it is worthwhile to inquire about both the manner and motive behind the
collection  of surplus from the people in a society. Surely,  the central administrative
units of any nation-state (defined in the subsequent section) must defend their rates of
taxation, proposed tax structures, budgeted tax revenues and other related measures.
An  inquiry  of  this  nature  warrants  an  understanding  of  the  nation-state  or
government  as  an  institution,  as  well  as  its  role  as  the  coordinater  of  our  socio-
economic reality.
2.2 Role of the State
The  concept  of  a  'state'  is  so  abstract  that  there  are  parties  that  dismiss  its  very
existence. According to Jessop (2006), there are different considerations that are made
in the attempt to characterize a 'state' –  its legal nature, coercive abilities, aims and
functions  or  its  role  and place in an international  context.  The State  is  sometimes
referred to as a subject,  when addressing what it  does or should do,  and it  is  also
perceived as a thing, an object used by different economic classes or political parties to
pursue their own interests. Another method to try defining a State may be to list the
various  institutions  that  the  state  is  comprised  of,  or  manages,  say,  legislature,
judiciary, defence, etc. Jessop refers to the German sociologist, Max Weber to observe
that  there  is  no  activity  which  a  state  always  performs  and  none  that  it  never
performs;  a  state  may  undertake  a  range  of  endeavours,  from  building  national
highways to family planning – it is known to have provided for it all. 
  Theorists,  however,  have  more  or  less  identified  the  crux  of  a  state  to  be  the
territorialization  of  political  authority.  Jessop  further  quotes  Weber  to  define  the
modern  state  as  the  “...  human  community  that  successfully  claims  legitimate
monopoly over the means of  coercion in a given territorial area” (p. 112) Such an
exposition fails to encompass the most fundamental role of a State or government –
that of coordinating human life – and excludes the pillar upon which societies rely on –
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cooperation. While definitions that come close to Weber's – emphasizing on the 'power'
element of a nation-state – are more popular, I wish to borrow Richard Musgrave's
definition (1999,  p.  31),  “...  the state  as an association of  individuals,  engaged in a
cooperative venture, formed to resolve problems of social coexistence and to do so in a
democratic and fair fashion. The state, in short, is a contractarian venture, based on
and reflecting the shared concerns of its individual members.” 
    My choice of Musgrave's quote intends to defeat the popular view of the government
as  the  people's  competitor  and  narrow  its  functions  to  provision  of  public  goods,
redistribution of wealth and establish social justice and also to stabilize an inherently
unstable capitalist economy. By an extrapolation of the quote, I further oppose the idea
of the process of taxation as a form of abuse, but what we “... pay for civilized society.”4
Here  I  also  wish  to  acknowledge  that  different  societies  might  find  themselves  in
entirely different socio-economic conditions and urgencies at various points in time,
thereby calling for a diverse set of policies based on what laws suit best the the social,
political  and  economic  circumstance  of  that  point  in  time.  Taking  the  case  of  a
developing nation with a particularly unique socio-economic structure such as India,
“problems of social coexistence” go as far as the eye can see and demand an intricate
web of decisions by its center of coordination. 
     To illustrate,  I  take the example of  three points in India's  economic history to
evaluate the state's fiscal intervention – 1951, 1993 and 2010. In 1951, the main aim of
the  First Five Year Plan's fiscal policy was to “raise, to the extent possible, through
taxation,  through  loans  and  through  surpluses  earned  on  state  enterprises,  a
considerable  portion  of  the  savings  needed.  The  financing  of  investments  through
public  savings would help to ensure a pattern of  development in consonance with
accepted social criteria.” (Purohit, M. & Purohit, V. 2014. p. 2) To accomplish this aim,
the Government of India raised larger resources from richer sects of society to provide
massive funds  towards the  public  sector,  especially  in  infrastructure  development.
Much farther down the timeline, the proposed  reforms to the tax structure in 1993
were largely to combat the “complicated and irrational tax system”5 including various
4 Quote by Justice Holmes in 1927 regarding a US tax case in the Supreme Court. 
5 As described by Chelliah, the Chairman of the Tax Reforms Committee set up in 1991, in his K R Narayanan oration at 
the Australia South Asia Research Centre in 1994. Sourced from Chelliah, R. (2006). Reforming India’s Tax Base for 
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cascading taxes and unjustified concessions. Government expenditure reforms along
with disinvestments of public sector undertakings were also carried out with the aim
of increasing operational efficiency through transfer of ownership to private hands.
Relatively recently, the 2010-11 Union Budget proposed an upward revision of tax slabs
as well as a multitude of tax incentives and exemptions in order to revive consumer
demand due to the economic slowdown. Evidently, policy or fiscal policy in specific is
managed given the economic context of a region. Each introduction or modification of
a policy is backed by the intention to bring about a certain change, based on some logic
or  normative  evaluation  that  the  legislating  group  believes  to  be  fit.  This  desired
'change' needs to be discussed, debated and concluded upon using ideas of 'what ought
to be', again, pertaining to the context of the socio-economic stage at that point in time. 
    Given the function of the state mentioned earlier, that of provision of public goods,
redistribution of wealth and establishing social justice, we may understand the process
of tax policy-making with regard to performing them. Musgrave (1999, p. 32) insists
that a vital dimension of social coexistence is “... distributive justice and the balance of
individual rights and obligations upon which a meaningful concept of liberty has to be
built.” The role of the State that this study will connect with the process of taxation is
that of ensuring social justice through the redistribution/reallocation of wealth and
income in the form of public goods and other services. In this context, as Piketty (2014,
p. 493) rightly asserts, “Taxation is not a technical matter. It is preeminently a political
and philosophical issue, perhaps the most important of all political issues.”  Therefore,
the fundamental question becomes,  how  ought the people of  a society manage their
surplus in order to reduce economic inequality? Narrower questions of concern might
be:  Who should  pay,  and  how much?  What  are the  individual  characteristics  of  a
citizen that a state and its people would choose to base the answers to these questions?
The various decisions or conclusions that may be taken with respect to these concerns
are all certainly endorsed by normative claims that I will attempt to engage with in the
following section.
Economic Development. In Jha R. (Ed.), The First Ten K R Narayanan Orations: Essays by Eminent Persons on the 
Rapidly Transforming Indian Economy (pp. 5-16). ANU Press. 
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2.3 The reality of inequality
The connect between social justice and redistribution lies in the fact that economic
inequality (in the form of wealth and personal distribution of  income) exists.  Why
exactly  it  is  desirable  to  do  away  with  inequality  is  outside  the  scope  of  this
dissertation, but I will nevertheless briefly touch upon why citizens, and specifically
policy makers, would be interested in prioritizing equality along with other basis of
economic reasoning. The proposition of equality is relevant to the question of social
justice  in  any  society  supported  by  a  capitalistic  economy.  In  such economies,  the
owners of the means of production have a disproportionate access to the produce of
industry, in the form of rents and profits. In order to address controversies regarding
whether the economic inequality prevalent in the economy is 'fair' and whether the
rich truly deserve their wealth, owing to 'risk-taking, hard work and skill',  I look to
Marx's critique of capitalism.
  Karl  Marx  (1867)  reserves  an  part  of  Capital to  the  concept  of  “primitive
accumulation” in  Capital  as one of the main concerns of classical political economy.
Marx describes primitive accumulation as the mass of capital that exists in the hands
of capitalists that is not obtained as a result of surplus/profit. The capitalist system of
production exhibits a pattern for the producers: first, the manufacture of commodities
earn a profit or surplus, which allows further capital accumulation followed by more
production, which again results in a surplus or profit. This cycle could not have started
without the possession of  some initial  capital in the hands of  the producers.  Marx
draws a parallel between primitive accumulation and the theological notion of original
sin – just as Adam's biting of the apple called sin upon the entire human race, the
capitalists' control over the initial round of capital brought poverty upon majority of
the  population  (workers).  In  this  sense,  Marx  (1867,  p.  508)  states  that  primitive
accumulation is “the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of
production,” since it totally separates the means of production from the workers who
produce  the  output.  According  to  him,  workers  experience  continued  hardships
despite their labour, while capitalists' wealth increased even without having to spend a
day of  effort.  In the Indian context,  one may hypothesize that the historical  social
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structure of the caste system has inherently provided certain sections of our society
with  much  larger  endowments  than  the  rest.  If  one  were  to  justify  capital
accumulation  with  the  risk-taking  and  hard-working  attributes  of  capitalists,  they
cannot extend the argument for the socio-economic injustice in the form of unequal
initial endowments, engraved by the caste system into the Indian society. Given the
above contention, one may still wish to ask, why ought the group of homo-economicus6
and their government be concerned about this inequality? 
     Bowles (2016) argues that the widely held assumption of homo-economicus is both
self-defeating as well  as  inaccurate.  This  same assumption,  in circles of  jurists  and
economists, that the average human is totally self-interested and void of any morals, is
what drives the massive system of incentives in today's economies. Policy makers now
introduce  material  incentives  for  worker  effectiveness,  environment-friendly
consumption,  etc.  that  could  otherwise  have  been  motivated  by  ethical  or
noneconomic reasons. Bowles states two reasons why it is not wise to assume a homo-
economicus  personality  of  people  –  one,  that  the  assumption of  “universal  amoral
selfishness”  might  be  self-fulfilling  as  it  is  the  presence  of  systems  of  material
incentives (that are based on this assumption) that lead people to act in more self-
interested manners than in their absence. Two, that material incentives are not the
appropriate tool to control selfish behaviour since it might cause the “crowding out” of
ethical motivations. It is entirely possible that a general civic-mindedness or desire to
uphold social norms (such as equity) may be lost as a result the introduction of policies
that  are  based on material  incentives.  This  means  that  a  person's  intrinsic  ethical
considerations, or their eagerness to cooperate with fellow citizens may be eroded if
selfish behaviour is in fact met with policies that induce more selfish behaviour. Using
the above logic, Bowles suggests that decision makers should be encouraged to limit
the  role  of  economic  incentives  in  public  policy  as  well  as  increase  the  role  of
government or informal nonmarket organizations in the allocation of resources.
6 Or 'economic man' in Latin, referring to a person who tries to maximise utility as a consumer and profit as a producer, 
using rational evaluations to make decisions. 
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2.4 Criteria for distinct treatment in collection of taxes
Having  introduced  and  established  the  rationale  of  state  intervention  in  ensuring
social  justice  by commenting on the role  of  the State  as a  third-party coordinator,
'primitive accumulation' and inequality, let us now explore the combined influence of
the State and norms in introducing fiscal policies, particularly, the reasoning used to
decide how much to tax whom. Various authors and economic thinkers, ranging from
Adam Smith to Piketty, have offered their conclusions on this matter. 
     For example, Smith's first maxim of taxation states that rates of tax must be based
on one's ability to contribute to the common costs of promoting collective interests of a
society. If it is intuitive that an individual with a higher income is also better able to
pay an amount of tax than someone with a lower income, there also exists numerous
differences  in  opinion,  often  philosophical,  regarding  such  a  proposition.  The
economist Sismondi argued7 for progressive taxation (a tax structure in which those
with higher income are taxed at higher rates than those with lower income) claiming
that since it is the state's job to prevent the poor from robbing from the rich, the rich
are but only paying for this service. On the other hand, John Stuart Mill criticizes8 such
a tax design, insisting that it “... is to lay a tax on industry and economy : to impose a
penalty on people for having worked harder and saved more than their neighbours”.
One could also argue for regressive taxes by  stating that the state protects life and
liberty which are equally valuable to the rich and poor. Justice or fairness, with regard
to fiscal policy, can and must be adjusted as per the acknowledgment of contemporary
political,  economic  and  social  conditions.  Thereby,  it  is  required  that  matters  of
taxation be justified using tools of ethics rather than economics alone. 
2.4.1 The Ability to Pay principle
It is an accepted claim that equal treatment or political equality of its citizens by a
7 As quoted in Myrdal, G.. (1969). The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory. New York : Simon 
and Schuster. 
8 Also quoted in Myrdal, G.. (1969). p. 167. The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory. New York : 
Simon and Schuster. 
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government  is  the  principle  feature  of  a  democratic  state;  the  Right  to  Equality  is
guaranteed to every Indian citizen, stated in Articles 14-18 of the Indian constitution.
Such  a  norm  can  be  followed  through  in  fiscal  matters,  but  there  exists  multiple
perspectives behind a policy decision because, though equality may be sought by all,
what it means to have a 'just' tax system has not been unanimously concluded upon.
'Equal treatment' could mean a lump-sum tax is paid by all and it could also imply a
progressive rate of taxation where the rich pay a higher rate than other citizens. Two
approaches to debate tax fairness are: (1) equal treatment and (2) the ability to pay.
The  equal  treatment  concept  suggests  that  everybody  should  be  taxed  the  same
amount and so, that both the rich and poor should pay a “flat tax” which amounts to
the same measure of payment. The ability to pay argument, as stated by  (Scheve, K., &
Stasavage, D. 2016. p. 5) considers that “a dollar in taxes for someone earning a million
dollars a year represents less of a sacrifice than it does for someone earning a more
average salary,” thereby implying that progressive taxation is the fair choice. However,
since we have established that economic inequality exists and the state may use fiscal
policy  as  a  means  through  which  they  may  redistribute  this  skewd  dispersion  of
income, I will examine the ways in which debates with regard to taxing the rich have
evolved. 
    Scheve and Stasavage (2016) present the beginning of such arguments that can be
formally dated back to the 16th century where Francesco Guicciardini produced a text
(La Decima Scelata) displaying both arguments for and against the city's government in
1500,  introducing  a  progressive tax  on land income known as  decima scalata. His
writings presented his arguments, “... the payment should be of a kind that one and the
other are inconvenienced to the same degree.” (p. 27) He also claimed that not only did
the  rich  need  to  spend  more  than  the  poor  to  maintain  themselves  but  they  also
deserved the higher income that they received because they had earned it. The latter
argument had already been furthered by another Florentine a century ago,  Matteo
Palmieri,  pressing that those who advanced beyond others not only practiced their
“craft or profession honestly and well,” (pg. 27) but also increased the common good
and therefore their privilege should be preserved and encouraged owing to their being
the most useful and worthy citizens of all. 
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    The concept of 'luxury', what it meant and whether it held any significant value at all
has  also  been  discussed  through  the  centuries  developing  along  alongside  the
expansion of commerce. That these 'luxuries' should be particularly taxed found an
ardent  proponent  in  Jean-Jacques  Rousseau in  the  18th century –  he  proposed that
items such as carriages,  chandeliers and mirrors may be taxed squarely since they
were  not  objects  of  necessity,  that  goods  should  accounted  for  in  terms  of  how
superfluous  they  were.  Those  opposing  such  an  idea  were  found  to  follow  the
arguments of Palmieri who claimed that the ability to pay criteria did not address the
source  of  the  wealth/income  of  the  rich,  the  same case  was  put  forward  by  Jean-
Francois  de Saint Lambert in the 18th century who thought that  the point  was not
whether luxury items were 'good or bad' but how it those items were generated. If
luxuries were procured as a result of some initial advantage provided by the state then
it is fair to remove such an advantage, otherwise it should be allowed to thrive. These
are clear examples of ability to pay being used and denied as a criteria for a 'fair'
system of taxation.
    Later, the 19th century saw what we now refer to as the “marginal revolution”, lead
by  the  works  of  economists  such  as  Jevons,  Menger  and  Walras.  Theoretical
frameworks, based on the measurement of marginal utility9 and diminishing marginal
utility10,  was employed to answer the question of what the rate of tax ought to be.
Using this school of thought, a handful of ideas emerged, eventually leading to a shift
of thought from considering equal sacrifice as a criteria for fairness to minimizing the
total loss from taxation to the whole of society. Thus, assessment of “equal absolute
sacrifice” or “equal proportional sacrifice” was left behind to pursue “equal marginal
sacrifice”.  As Edgeworth proposes, this essentially meant that the utility lost from the
last dollar of taxation for each individual was identical, thereby maximizing aggregate
social  welfare,  or  the  effect  of  distribution  of  income,  resources  or  commodities
influence  the  economic  well-being  of  a  society  as  a  whole.   Another  important
development was the increase in focus on the question of whether wealth had been
initially generated unfairly in the first place: Walter Blum and Harry Kalven's 1952
9 A measurement of the gain in benefit from consuming an additional unit of a commodity. 
10 A law which states that the utility gained from every additional unity of a commodity consumed will start diminishing, 
or, increase at a diminishing rate.
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critique called “The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation” insisted that arguments for
progressive  taxation  were  'intellectually  weak'  since  there  was  no  reference  to
whether the income/wealth was justly or unjustly earned, a condition they felt was
important to make decisions regarding the possibility of progressive taxation. Scheve
and Stasavage (2016, p. 32) write of another critique for the ability to pay doctrine,  by
Lionel  Robbins  in  1932:  he  argued  that  it  was  impossible  to  compare  the  utility
functions of all citizens, thereby impossible to apply any equal sacrifice standard for
taxation.  In other words,  the phenomenon of  diminishing marginal utility for each
individual alone is not sufficient to believe that the transfer of wealth from the rich to
the poor will increase total utility11.
    Finally, the quest for equity in terms of fiscal policy, might also include questions
regarding what of the rich ought to be taxed. Piketty (2014) suggests a tax on capital.
His reasons are clearly presented in Capital in the 21st Century:  to keep an eye on, or
control  in  whatever  little  way,  the  levels  of  capital  accumulation  by  the
capitalists/super-wealthy,  to  stay  clear  from  the  path  leading  to  an  inegalitarian
economy and to unmask the concentration of wealth to the public eye. Piketty suggests
that  the most  appropriate  tool  to  go about  these motives  would  be to  introduce  a
progressive tax on capital.  Here,  a tax on capital will  include levies on the flow of
income from capital, such as corporate income tax, as well as tax on the value of the
stock of capital, such as estates and wealth. This device would accomplish democratic
financial  transparency  (expose  the  true  location/concentration  of  wealth  that  is
otherwise not really known) as well as regulate capitalism and block the indefinite
increase  in  inequality  of  wealth.  The  tax  on  capital  will  include  all  assets  of  the
individual – real estate, financial, non financial, business assets, etc. and not just the
income of that individual,  which may only be a fraction of their fortune.  Another
justification to tax capital is that it would act as an incentive to encourage investors to
seek the best possible return on capital stock,  or sell  assets (in order to reduce tax
payments) so that better users of the wealth may invest better. 
11 Total utility refers to the sum of all individuals' utilities. 
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Chapter 3
Enquiry through Economic Concepts
The study of Economics, in its various sub-fields makes conclusions, suggestions and
predictions about society and the activities it undertakes for its sustenance. Classical
economics, popular from the 18th century to the mid 19th century, explored the political
economy and theorized the variability of value in terms of profit, rent and wages in
the context of the rise of capitalism. Neoclassical economics, on the other hand with
the  help  of  a  novel  framework  featured  by  perfect  competition,  with  a  focus  on
individual's  preferences  and  endowments  enquired  upon  prices  and  quantities  of
commodities  and factors of  production in a  market.  For the purpose of  explaining
social phenomena,  while classical  economics adopts the doctrine of  methodological
holism,  attending  to  social  institutions  and  existing  power  dynamics,  neoclassical
economics follows methodological individualism, fixating on individuals' preferences
and actions.
    This chapter will survey the various observations, ideas and theories concerning the
effects of taxation; section 3.1 will briefly address the effects of taxation in a classical
economics framework by studying the writings of four note-worthy scholars – Smith,
Ricardo, Malthus and J.S. Mill. This will be followed by section 3.2, which attempts to
enquire about the effects of taxation in the economy using neoclassical concepts. This
section  will  also  include  an  elaboration  on  the  history  and  relevance  of  Pareto
optimality as the popular measurement of efficiency, one of the desired characteristics
of a tax system, as well as the concept of tax incidence and the challenge it poses to the
State's political responsibility in introducing tax designs that are transparent, a second
desired characteristic of a tax system.
3.1 Taxation in classical economics
Kurz and Salvadori (1998) illustrates on the many analyses of the effects of taxes by
classical economists in the 18th and 19th centuries:  Smith, in chapter 2 of book V in
Wealth of  Nations, writes extensively on taxation. Using his assumptions of natural
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price, natural rates of wages, profits and rents, he concludes the following: (1) Tax on
raw produce decreases rent, leaving prices of raw produce, necessities and luxuries
unaltered; (2) Taxes on necessities, wages, and profits reduce rent, raising the prices of
necessities and luxuries; (3) A tax on luxuries increases their price, but keeps nominal
rent  and  the  price  of  necessities  unchanged;  and  (4)  A  tax  on  rent  reduces  rent,
maintaining  the  prices  of  raw  produce,  necessities  and  luxuries.  Through  these
conclusions  we arrive at  the  point  that  all  taxes,  except  those on luxuries,  reduce
nominal rent. A further judgement made by Smith is that the 'main' taxpayers in a
country are its landlords, since tax on luxuries (as opposed to on necessities and raw
produce)  increase  the  prices  of  luxuries  which  are  largely  purchased  by  these
landlords. While Smith did not suggest what type of taxation to impose, we infer that
he preferred taxes on luxuries, rather than on other commodities that would decrease
rent,  thereby interfering with the improvement of land. 
    Ricardo, in his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation concludes that taxes on
raw produce, necessities, wages and (direct tax on) profit, will reduce the rate of profit
and increase the price of these commodities, as opposed to the tax falling on rent, as
per Smith's theory (this is because rent is not included in the cost and price calculation
of  raw  produce).  Since  profit  was  known  to  be  the  main  source  of  capital
accumulation, he was against any tax that meddled with or reduced these profits. We
understand  that  Smith  was  of  the  opinion  that  taxation  would  transfer  private
consumption into public consumption, while Ricardo was in opposition of high taxes
because he believed that it was private savings that would be transferred to public
consumption. 
    Malthus did not elaborate on his ideas about taxation, halted by two contradictions –
one, the inability of owners of marginal land to pay taxes due to the law of diminishing
returns which disallowed the owner to receive rents. Malthus would either have to
develop a theory of rent such that marginal land received positive rent, or, dismiss
Smith's conclusion that taxes on raw produce ultimately fell on rent. Second, Malthus,
as a rival of the Poor Law, also claimed that minimal taxes were more preferable but
he  also  felt  that  unproductive  consumption  from  taxes  acted  as  incentive  for
production, or in other words, he acknowledged the demand creating effect of taxes. 
14
    Lastly, J.S.Mill also commented on the issue of taxation in his Principles of Political
Economy. Mill's observations on taxes was in the context of a more dynamic process by
which  the  economy  moves  towards  a  'stationary  state'12.  Prescribing  to  Ricardo's
opinion that taxes on raw produce or profit ate up rates of profit,  Mill additionally
believed  that  taxes  would  also  fall  on  rent  and  wages,  suggesting  that  Ricardo's
analysis was only applicable to the stationary state. 
3.2 Taxation in neoclassical economics
Neoclassical microeconomic theory, developed in the 19th century, offered a paradigm
shift in studying the economy. Using concepts such as budget constraints and utility,
the theory captures the interactions between individual decision makers such as the
consumer  and  firm.  It  also  relies  on  assumptions  such  as  rationality  and  perfect
competition  to  present  profit  or  utility  maximizing  decisions/outcomes  in  a  free
market. Through the above mentioned components, it also offers ways of evaluating
what the “efficient” allocations of resources may be, a topic we will ponder on later in
this  chapter.  Another  characteristic  of  neoclassical  theory  is  the  extensive  use  of
quantitative methods of enquiry or prediction. Policy makers, therefore, rely not only
on normative evaluations but largely borrow from microeconomic theory to ensure
desired results. Similarly in the context of taxation, there will be some criteria, which
borrows the microeconomic theoretical framework to determine what a favourable
tax system would be like; two important criteria that evaluates whether a tax system is
favourable  are:  that  it  imposes  minimal  interference  in  the  'efficient'  allocation of
resources and that it satisfies political transparency, that is, any individual must know
how  much  tax  they  are  paying  and  whether  the  current  system  satisfies  their
preferences. Both these criteria will  be elaborated in length in the coming sections
3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
12 Stationary state here refers to a situation of economic stagnation where the economy will have reached the limits of 
economic growth and reproduce wealth by “replacing worn- out goods, maintaining capital stocks, and carefully 
husbanding nonrenewable resources”, as sourced from Buckley M. (2011) John Stuart Mill and the Idea of a Stationary 
State Economy. In: Dierksmeier C., Amann W., von Kimakowitz E., Spitzeck H., Pirson M. (eds) Humanistic Ethics in 
the Age of Globality. Humanism in Business Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London
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3.2.1 Effects of taxation
Given the desirable characteristics mentioned above, one may want to begin observing
the consequences of taxation, or a system of taxation in particular. It is important to
note that the neoclassical perspective assumes a perfectly competitive market for the
purpose  of  its  theorizing.  This  perfect  competition  is  characterized  by:  perfect
knowledge  and flow of  information,  rational  consumers  and producers  who make
rational decisions in order to maximize their utility and are also too many in number
to individually influence market prices. In such a market, taxation enters the picture
as  an  interference  that  has  numerous  impacts  on  the  operations  of  this  perfectly
competitive market. Stiglitz and Rosengard (2015) elaborate on this efficient allocation
of resources – in a free market without the imposition of taxes, market prices would
express information about the product that would lead  to production, exchange and
product mix efficiency13. Once that product is taxed, it alters relative prices leading to
inefficiency.  Efficiency, here, implies that the marginal benefit attained by producing
one more unit of any commodity should equal its marginal cost. If the marginal benefit
exceeds the marginal cost, society would gain more from producing more of the good;
if  the  marginal  benefit  was  less  than  the  marginal  cost,  society  would  gain  from
reducing production of  the good.  In other  words,  the  market  is  equilibrium when
market  demand  equals  market  supply,  where  marginal  benefit  is  equivalent  to
marginal costprice. Thus, conditions for efficiency are defeated if taxes modify relative
prices  as  it  will  no  longer  reflect  and signal  for  efficient  levels  of  production and
exchange of commodities.
     This inefficient allocation of resources may occur due to various effects of taxation
on the  interlinked activities  of  an economy.  Stiglitz  and Rosengard (2015)  present
some of  these effects  in  Economics of  the  Public  Sector.  A popularly debated upon
consequence of taxes is that it might also discourage people to work as well as distort
13 Production, exchange and product mix efficiency are basic conditions for pareto efficiency. Production efficiency is the 
point at which the marginal rate of technical substitution between any two inputs is equal; exchange efficiency is the 
point at which the marginal rate of substitution between any two commodities is equal for all individuals; and product 
mix efficiency is the point at which the marginal rate of transformation is equal to the marginal rate of substitution. 
Perfectly competitive markets satisfy all four conditions. (Stiglitz & Rosengard, 2015. pg. 78)
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decisions  (as  opposed  to  the  'pure'  rational  decisions  that  a  economic  agent  may
otherwise have resorted to) relating to consumption and production. Some peculiar
examples for this claim is the window tax that was introduced in Britain in the 1600s,
inducing the construction of many windowless homes in those times. Taxes may also
result  in  some far-reaching behavioural  changes.  The decision-making processes of
individuals affected by different types of taxes are plentiful: the levels and forms of
investments,  that  is,  what portion of  national  savings are allocated to housing and
equipment,  etc.,  the rate at which natural resources may be extracted – either at a
judicious or unsustainable rate and risk-taking. Through such allocations, taxes may
affect  macro  variables  in  an economy such  as  consumption,  savings  and  levels  of
work.
    Another effect of taxation pointed out by Stiglitz and Rosengard (2015) are financial
in nature.  This  is  not  only  in terms of  amount  spent/saved but also  its  'form'.  For
example,  there  is  no  practical  difference  in  whether  an  employer  provides  their
employee the income to purchase health insurance or purchases it for them (in the
form of “benefits) instead, other than that the former transaction will be taxed and the
latter will not.  In the same manner, saving directly for one's retirement or having
one's employer take part of your income to invest in a fully funded pension plan has
no practical difference, except for the tax implications. Such differences in the form of
transactions has  a  direct  influence on one's  behaviour,  for  instance,  investment  or
consumption  might  be  different  in  individuals  under  the  different  conditions
mentioned above. It is possible that some individuals may be “forced” to save through
their pension plan more than they would have voluntarily done otherwise. 
    A third important implication of taxes in the market is organizational in nature.
Whether the current system of taxes favours corporations or companies can encourage
or  discourage  economic  activity  of  that  form,  thereby  influencing  the  degree  and
nature of risk taking in the economy. Different tax systems can also impact the choice
of financial institutions or arrangement (banks as opposed to stock or bond markets)
which again, decide the organization of the credit or finance in the economy. A gender
economist  would  identify  that  taxes  also  alter  the  consumption  patterns  within
households.  For  example,  some  taxes  may  encourage  “inside  firm  consumption”
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(similar to what was mentioned regarding the forms of financial transactions),  and
only tax the payments from firms to household (income). This implies that employees
(largely men, owing to prevalent occupational segregation) will be discriminated in
favour of, as opposed to their partners who worked within home (largely women). 
    Finally,  a  more  indirect  effect  of  taxation  is  that  on  announcements  and
capitalization – if the future details of a tax on a particular asset is announced, there is
an immediate impact on its current value. For example, say, taxes on housing is about
to be increased, the price of this category may experience a fall – subjecting the current
owners of these assets to bear the major burden of the tax. It is also possible that the
very anticipation of  taxes,  and not  even its  announcement,  can affect  the value of
assets. 
3.2.2 Efficiency: a critical examination
Given the above mentioned effects of taxation on the efficient allocation of resources
in an economy, it is also true that efficiency is a major consideration in the process of
fiscal  policy  deliberation.  Through the  neoclassical  lens,  no  matter  the  manner  in
which an individual or firm responds to a tax, the collection of a fraction of their assets
(in whatever form) will make that party worse off. Taking the simple case of a tax on a
commodity, borne fully by a consumer, an individual will be able to purchase less of
the commodity that is being taxed, owing to their budget constraint. This decrease in
consumption of the taxed commodity could be due to two reasons: the income effect,
because the tax has made the individual worse off, and also the substitution effect, the
tax  has  made  the  commodity  relatively  more  expensive  than  others,  encouraging
consumers  to  purchase  other  products  instead.  Essentially,  taxes  are  a  transfer  of
purchasing  power  from an individual  to  the  State  and  for  the  reasons  mentioned
above,  create  distortions  that  are considered to  be a  loss  of  efficiency.  This  loss  is
measured in the form of a concept called 'deadweight loss', which is the extra loss in
welfare or output as a result of a distortion to the equilibrium between the supply and
demand for a commodity. In other words, it is the sum of both consumer and producer
surplus  that  is  lost  when,  say,  the  quantity  supply  of  a  particular  commodity  has
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decreased due to the increase in cost of production that a tax on that commodity may
impose. 
    For example, an extra loss in welfare can be measured in the comparison of the
effect of a tax on a single commodity with that of a lumpsum tax. This comparison is
essentially an evaluation – for the same impact on an individual's welfare, how much
extra revenue would a lumpsum tax have raised instead, or, how much less revenue a
tax on a single commodity is able to raise. The difference in revenue will be a measure
of the deadweight loss of the tax. Another example that is  often used in the battle
against progressive taxes is that the more progressive a tax, the larger the deadweight
loss or inefficiencies that arise from it. Progressivity implies that the average tax ratio
(or the ratio of total tax payments to the individual's income) increases with income;
this means that the more progressive a tax, higher the marginal rate, thereby leading
to a larger deadweight loss. This directly suggests a tradeoff between efficiency and
equity (since we have already concluded in chapter 2 that progressive taxes are more
equitable). 
   Following the exploration of various concepts and matters that may be of concern to
policy makers, it  is important that we further critically evaluate the concept that is
given the lion's share of attention – the high and mighty “efficiency”. Theoretically,
given the perfectly competitive market whose features we have discussed in section
2.2.1, the economy in this state is said to be efficient, in that it allows the production,
distribution and consumption of commodities by the allocation of resources with the
help of prices. Such an ideal situation would thus have no need for any intervention.
While  justifications  for  government  intervention,  such  as  market  failure,  will  be
elaborated on in chapter 4, here I will attempt to define what an efficient market has
been theorized to be, or what the popular notion of economic efficiency is. 
    One of the earliest and most popular concepts about the free market is 'the invisible
hand' as in Adam Smith's  Wealth of Nations,  in 1776. Stiglitz and Rosengard (2015)
contrasts the notion of the invisible hand with the belief that was previously carried,
that  fulfilling  the  best  interests  of  the  public  required  government  action  or
participation (the mercantilist view of 17th and 18th centuries that government should
promote  industry  and  trade).  At  this  time,  some  countries  greatly  benefited  from
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government  action  while  others  prospered  even  without.  However,  some  did  not
flourish; on the contrary had had their resources squandered in the name of wars or
unsuccessful public ventures. In such a situation, when leaders or government may
not always be trusted with the fulfillment of public interest, Smith spoke of how the
public interest could be served if individuals acted upon their self-interest, since such a
characteristic of human nature was much more persistent than “a concern to do good”
(p. 62), thus providing a reliable basis for the organization of society/economy. It is also
easier for an individual to determine what is in their own self interest than to decide
for the public's interest. 
   Further, the competition between firms for profits (where a consumer's value for an
item is higher than the cost of producing it) leads to two beneficial outcomes in public
interest – efficient ways of production (those adopting inefficient methods will exit the
market once they incur losses) and new commodities (if individuals are willing to pay
more  than  the  cost  of  production).  There  seems  to  be  no  need  of   government
government  intervention  in  such  a  situation.  This  is  the  underlying  basis  for  the
popular consensus (among economists and otherwise) that competitive markets in the
absence  of  State  intervention  lead  to  higher  levels  of  efficiency  and  encourages
innovation. In the context of taxation, efficiency loss due to a tax is “the excess of the
reduction in the consumer's welfare above and beyond that which can be accounted
for by the income loss due to payment of the tax” (Bagchi,  2005,  p.  180) Thus,  this
efficiency loss is referred to as the excess burden of the tax, as it arises from the tax
induced distortion only, when comparing taxed and non taxed commodities.
Free markets, in this way, are celebrated for their efficiency. However, contemporary
policy  makers  and  economists,  in  an  attempt  to  recommend  the  optimal  'mix'  of
government intervention and market mechanisms to run the economy, begin the quest
for Pareto optimality. A Pareto optimal or efficient allocation of resources is one which,
when adopted, does not have an alternative allocation by one can be made better off
without  making someone else  worse  off.  Policy  makers  find themselves  opting  for
policies with the belief that any Pareto improvements (changes that make some better
off without making anyone else worse off) should be instituted. The field of Welfare
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Economics, one that is motivated by normative issues of ensuring the welfare of all
members of society, borrows and makes heavy use of the Pareto principle. The first
fundamental  theorem  of  the  same,  as  a  description  of  the  relations  between
competitive  markets  and  Pareto  efficiency  state  that:  any  competitive  equilibrium
leads to a Pareto optimal allocation of resources, or in other words, a social optimum;
this  theorem  directly  acts  as  a  strong  justification  for  the  reliability  of  market
mechanisms. 
    Pareto optimality is therefore widely used and trusted amongst economists and
policy makers. Berthonnet (2016) reviews the journey from Vilfredo Pareto himself in
the 19th century to its use and relevance in contemporary economics. With regard to
explaining  social  phenomena,  Pareto  thought  that  the  socioeconomic  truth  needed
both economics and sociology and described a specific method: first pure economics as
a first basis of the analysis for an abstract level of explanation, followed by sociology
which included both pure and applied economics. According to him, pure economics
studied logical actions and sociology, non-logical actions; they differed in the object of
study  and  not  necessarily  their  methodology  of  empirical  observations.  Pure
economics as defined by Pareto, was an evaluation of the means to reach some goal.
Berthonnet considers this a narrow definition in that it limits the role of economics to
study the means alone, leaving the concern of what the goal may be outside its scope.
In her paper, she quotes Raymond Aron, “Isn’t it a result of the definition provided for
logical actions that the choice of goals cannot be logical?” (p. 168) Thus, the goals for a
society becomes necessarily decided outside the study of economics. Due to such a
description, the economics that Pareto thought himself to be an author of was a purely
positive  science,  based  on  empirical  observations,  void  of  any  value  or  political
judgements. In this context,  the “maximum of ophelimity” introduced by Pareto as:
The maximum of ophelimity is defined as follows: We will say that the members
of a community enjoy, in a certain position, the maximum of ophelimity, when it
is impossible to slightly move away from this position, so that the ophelimity of
each individual of this community rises or goes down. This is to say that every
little move from this position has the necessary effect of rising some individuals’
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ophelimity, and of diminishing that of others: to be pleasant to some, unpleasant
to others.
                                   Pareto, 1963; as quoted by Berthonnet, 2015: 169
This position is purely scientific, according to Pareto, and names it the “P-point”, an
objective feature of a particular type of market equilibrium, without any normative
suggestion. While Pareto claims this position to be purely scientific, a sharp definition
with no relation to social utility, it  inherently expresses a desirable state, hinting at
some normative judgement. This contradicts the method and scope of pure economics
that he had initially set. 
    Such a “hesitation” (as Berthonnet calls it) between pure and normative economics
left Pareto's ophelimity up for grabs by economists in 20th century normative welfare
economics, as Pareto 'optimality', later also increasingly replaced as Pareto 'efficiency'.
The  use  of  Pareto's  ophemility  as  an  evaluation  for  social  justice,  given  Pareto's
attitude  towards  ethics  and  justice  (he  claimed  that  such  considerations  were
unscientific) is contradictory. Quoting Berthonnet's words: 
Therefore,  the  first  economic  theories  that  have  built  upon  the  Paretian
maximum of ophelimity belonged to a field of research which had nothing to do
with  the  original  methodological  framework  in  which  it  was  introduced...
Pareto’s  proposition  has  lost  the  status  of  descriptive  characteristic  of
competitive equilibrium that he had attributed to it, and has become a minimal
desired norm.
                                   Berthonnet, 2016: 173
In any case, another obvious inadequacy that we may identify in this Pareto approach,
particularly since it is extensively referred to in policy making (in the context of the
discussions in the previous chapter) is that it is very individualistic. In other words, it
is  not  concerned with  relative  inequality:  making a  rich person better  off  without
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changing anything for a poor person would still  be considered Pareto efficient. For
example, when developing countries undergo rapid growth of their economies, income
on an average may rise but rises much more rapidly for the richer section of society
than the poor, which Pareto efficiency does not acknowledge. 
3.2.3 Tax burden and tax incidence
The imposition of a tax in an economy inevitably has some effect on an individual's
disposable income. A tax burden can be defined as the true economic weight of a tax,
or, “the difference between the individual's real income before and after the tax has
been  imposed,  taking  full  account  of  how  wages  and  prices  may  have  adjusted.”
(Stiglitz and Rosengard, 2015)
     The identification of two broad types of taxes will help us to further scrutinize the
effects  of  a  taxation  on  the  welfare  of  individuals  –   distortionary  and  non-
distortionary forms of taxes. Stiglitz and Rosengard (2015) state that non distortionary
does  not  imply  that  the  individual  will  not  react  to  the  change,  but  that  “there  is
nothing an individual or firm can do to alter the tax liability.” (p. 516) These can also
be referred to as “lump-sum taxes” (for example, a head tax, which one has to pay
regardless of income or wealth). Individuals and firms cannot avoid them, and so, they
do not lead to changes in behaviour or the reallocation of resources, other than the
income  effect  of  after-tax  income.  In  contrast,  distortions  occur  when  an
individual/firm can and attempts to lower their tax liability. In the case of taxes on
commodities, by simply purchasing less of that commodity. Tax on income can also be
distortionary because an individual can reduce her tax liability by working less. 
    Thus, the possibility of distortion due to the shifting of burden poses a challenge to
the political responsibility of transparency that policy makers bear – the proposed tax
system must be one that is aware and makes public of who really bears the “burden” of
the  tax.  If  a  state  legislature is  in  the process  of  passing  some tax policy,  there is
discussion regarding whom they want to levy the said tax on, on the basis of some
economic or normative rationale (as we have discussed in chapter 2). The nature of
distortionary taxes, thus, also calls for a distinction between whom a tax is imposed on
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and who finally 'pays it'. A measure of the  actual  incidence of tax from the  intended
incidence  of  tax  is  known as  'tax  incidence':  for  example,  as  a  result  of  some tax
imposed on firms, wages might fall or prices might rise. If the wages fall, it means that
the tax has “shifted backward” to a factor of production (labour) and if prices rise, it
means that the tax has “shifted forward” to the consumers. This shift can be measured
in terms of the amount of the tax that has been relocated (as part of the wage/price) – if
the wage or price has increased or decreased by the full amount of tax levied, we can
say that it has fully shifted and if by less than the amount, we say that it has partially
shifted. 
    For example, in the US case of Social Security tax having (by law) levied half from
the employer and half from the worker, it could be that that the employer-paid part of
the Social Security tax is shifted backward and that the employees bear the full burden
of the tax that is actually imposed on the employers, in the form of lower wages. 
    The discussion around the incidence of corporate tax is inconclusive: while part of
the burden of corporate tax is on capital as a whole, the intended target of the tax, it
may be that a large portion of the tax is shifted to and borne by consumers if the firms
raise their prices as a consequence of being taxed. Similarly, if wages fall due to the fall
of demand of labour, the workers bear the tax. 
     Studying the incidence of tax is both a very important and difficult field of public
sector economics14 since it may suggest what is fair and unfair; it also almost never
easy  to  accurately  work  out who  finally  carries  its  burden.  Given  the  desirable
characteristic of transparency, a tax policy should be both, one with a clear indication
of  the nature of incidence as well as one that “makes the apparent incidence of a tax
correspond to the actual incidence” (Stiglitz and Rosengard, 2015. p. 539). 
    The incidence of tax depends on many factors – on whether the economy is perfectly
competitive, and if it is, on the shapes of the demand and supply curves (the elasticities
of demand and supply). In the case of a tax on firms, firms produce or supply their
goods when their marginal cost is  equal to their  marginal revenue, or,  when their
marginal cost is equal to the price of their products. Thus, a tax on the production of
14 A field of economics that is concerned with the effects of government intervention of markets in the form of 
government revenue, expenditure and investment decisions. 
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the commodity will have some effect on the firm's production decision as this tax is an
addition to its cost of production. As a result, the amount that the firm is willing to
supply for the current price will be less, post tax. This also implies that post-tax, the
price  at  which  the  the  market  (addition  of  supply  of  all  firms  producing  that
commodity) is willing to supply a certain level of output has increased. This shift in
market supply can be determined almost directly from the amount of tax that has been
imposed on the production of that commodity. In this manner,  though the tax was
“nominally” imposed on producers, consumers end up being forced to pay part (or
whole)  of  the  increased  cost,  thereby distorting  the  current  market  equilibrium to
produce a new market equilibrium. In such a scenario it does not matter whether the
tax is levied on consumers or on producers: if the same tax that had been previously
levied on producers is now imposed on consumers, they would still pay the old price
plus the tax and the producer would still receive the same revenue as they would not
need to pay direct attention to the tax that the consumer is paying to the government,
since they only care about what they receive. 
     However, the amount by which the prices rise, or the extent to which consumers
bear a tax will depend on the shape of the demand and supply curves, or their price
elasticities (measure of response to changes in price). It is important to note that price
elasticity  is  determined  by  characteristics  of  the  commodity  –  whether  they  are
necessary goods such as medicines, which have very low elasticity because no matter
the change in prices, consumers will continue to purchase the items; or whether they
are luxury goods such as a TV, which have high elasticity since consumers decision to
purchase is no longer based on necessity and so is highly dependant on the price of the
commodity. If the demand is perfectly inelastic, or supply is perfectly elastic, the entire
burden of tax is bourne by the consumers. On the other hand, if the demand curve is
perfectly horizontal or supply curve is perfectly vertical (in a graphical presentation),
prices paid by the consumers do not rise at all and the producers bear the complete
burden instead. Generally, the steepness can determine whether the tax will be borne
more  by  the  consumer  or  the  producer  (steeper  demand,  flatter  supply,  borne  by
consumer and vice versa).
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3.2.4 Further considerations for tax design
We have explored in detail regarding the two desirable characteristics of a tax system –
that  it  will  have  minimal  influence  on  the  efficient  allocation  of  resources  in  an
economy  (Pareto  efficiency)  and  that  the  structure  and  incidence  of  the  taxes  is
transparent and known to everyone. We can now briefly review what frameworks a
government may adopt in the process of choosing one tax policy/design over another.
Again, keeping in mind the State's role in ensuring some contemporary idea of social
justice, we know that it may opt to test a tax system for both its efficiency and equity
potential. Both yardsticks are just as important as each other in the larger picture of
socioeconomic coexistence – efficiency ensures that we coordinate activities in such a
way that a society's resources usefully and equity ensure that a tax structure is not
regressive in nature. The very process of decision making is outside the scope of this
paper, however, we can speculate (in the absence of both technical and political detail)
that  the respective policy makers may want to choose,  among the available Pareto
efficient tax structures, one that represents its normative  attitude towards the welfare
of all, but different, individuals in a society. This step can be made possibly by choosing
a social welfare function, that will “... separate efficiency considerations from value
judgements.” (Stiglitz and Rosengard, 2015. p. 532) 
    Two such social welfare functions used by economists, as presented by Stiglitz and
Rosengard  (2015)  are  the  utilitarian  and  Rawlsian  approaches.  In  the  utilitarian
approach social welfare equals “the sum of all individuals' utilities” (p. 533);  in the
Rawlsian approach, social welfare equals “the utility of the worst-off individual” (p.
534) . Both functions can be used to determine by how much taxes should increase
with  income,  consumption  or  other  bases  that  are  used  for  taxation.  With  the
utilitarian  approach,  a  tax  design  will  be  chosen  to  match  the  principle  that  the
marginal utility of income, or the loss in utility from taking a rupee away from an
individual, must be the same for all individuals. In this manner, utilitarianism is found
to provide a rationale for progressive taxation, or, the taxation of rich individuals at
higher rates than poor individuals,  using the assumption that the poor have higher
marginal utility of income than the rich, thus causing them more loss of welfare than
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the rich when same amounts of tax is collected from both individuals. However, this
rationale does not take into consideration that if an individual's income depends on
their  work  or  effort,  raising  taxes  on  higher  earning  individuals  may  very  well
discourage this effort and reduce their work. An implication of this consideration is
that “... raising the tax rate actually reduces the government's tax revenue, or that the
marginal utility loss to the individual per dollar raised by the government may be very
large.” (Stiglitz and Rosengard, 2015. p. 533) 
    Such an idea describes the famous Laffer curve, a graphical presentation showing
the decrease in tax revenue with the increase in tax rates beyond some threshold.
Many arguments particularly note that this  may not be  applicable to poor because
when their taxe are increased they need to work harder to meet basic needs. Lower
tax  rate  means  more  money  collected,  and  so  high  tax  rate  is  pareto  inefficient.
Utilitarianism also implies horizontal equity – if everyone with similar utility functions
also had the same income, they should be taxed the same. Speaking in utility terms, if
an individual A was taxed at a higher rate than another B, both of whom have the
same income,  A's  marginal  utility  for  income would be higher.  Raising  a  tax on B
would cause them less loss in utility than the gain in utility that would be caused by
lowering  the  tax  on  A  (But  this  argument  only  holds  if  income  is  believed  to  be
unaffected). However, it is important to note that the concept of utility or individual
utility functions cannot be easily determinable in reality, as this measure is subjective
to every individual.
    Given that some philosophers and economists believe that the utilitarian approach
may not necessarily be equality or equity ensuring, there is a second social welfare
function that subscribes to the work of John Rawls. This approach states that society
should be concerned with the welfare of the worst off individual and ought to design
economic or social policies so that the welfare of this individual is maximised. The
direct implication for tax policies would be to increase tax rates on everyone excluding
the  worst  off  individual  until  tax  revenues  are  maximised.  (But  this  does  not
necessarily  mean  that  the  richest  individuals  be  taxed  at  the  highest  rates  or
progressivity  in  the  tax  rates).  There  are  still,  criticisms  that   even  the  Rawlsian
approach may not be egalitarian – if a policy change makes the worst off individual
27
slightly better off, while making the richest section of the population much better off,
this cannot be called equitable and yet is desirable under the Rawlsian framework.
   Thus, given the two social welfare options (out of many), it is evident that even with a
neoclassical analysis of the consequences or technicalities of taxation, there are still
normative requirements from the part of policy makers to choose whether they ought




Views on Public Finance
Every State in the world has adopted some form of administration of economic policy,
regulations, provision of public goods and/or other coordinative activities. However, it
is not the case that all government opt for similar approaches or projects concerning
economic intervention; on the contrary, the distinction(s) between countries and their
public sector is vast on numerous accounts. A difference one may easily observe is that
of the scale of size of the public sector. This variable alone determines many economic
and social features of a society, thereby calling for different perspectives and opinions
regarding its value by economists, policy makers as well as the public. The following
chapter attempts to present the various arguments for and against greater extents of
government intervention, or the size of the public sector in a nation. Following a brief
introduction and description of the role of the State in terms of public finance, I will
elaborate on some arguments for public finance, including the importance of public
goods as well as philosophical ideas by authors such as Piketty , Bagchi and Musgrave.
This will be followed some arguments against a generous approach to public finance,
such  as  economic  destabilization  and  government  failure.  Finally,  the  equity  vs.
efficiency  debate  will  be  commented  on,  using  the  content  of  the  previous  two
chapters.
4.1 Public finance and the role of the state
According  to  Bagchi  (2005),  the  terrain  of  public  finance  strives  to  settle  “...  the
finances  of  the  government,  how  much  of  a  country's  resources  the  government
should acquire for its own use, how and what makes for their efficient spending...” (p.
1) According to him, two areas of concern in public finance are: (1) The raising of funds
for the working of the public sector through taxes or borrowing – its implication for
the equity in and efficiency of the economy. (2) The decision of what the appropriate
roles and size of the public sector should be. Of the two areas, we have already covered
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the first by enquiring into multiple normative analyses and Pareto considerations that
assists policy makers in the choice of tax systems. The second area of interest first
requires  an  introduction  to  what  consists  of  the  public  sector  are  as  well  as  the
measurement of its 'size'. 
    The public  sector is  that  part  of  the economy which comprises of  State  owned
enterprises that provide public goods and services, such as transportation, education
and health facilities, among the many. This includes industries that are funded by the
revenue  collected  through  taxation,  user-charges  from  public  services  offered  by
government operations as well as fines and concessions. Some of the key differences of
the public  sector from the private sector,  apart  from the capital/resources that are
collected and utilized to fund its administration is that it is fundamentally not driven
by  profit.  It  is  also  the  case  that  the  public  sector  produces  and  maintains  many
essential  commodities  that  are  non-excludable  and  non-rivalrous15.  Non-excludable
implies that the consumption of a public good cannot be exclusive to taxpayers alone.
The most quoted example is that of defence. The performance of defense personnel
benefits all within the borders of a nation, regardless of whether they are members of
the income tax bracket or not.  Non-rivalrous indicates that the consumption of the
public good by person B is not reduced by its consumption by person A. That public
goods are not profit-driven, combined with its features of non-excludable and non-
rivalrous indicate its importance in the economy and its expression of the role of the
State in “... ensuring social justice through the redistribution/reallocation of wealth or
income in the form of public goods and other services” as mentioned in chapter 2. The
relevance of public goods will be further elaborated in section 4.2.
    The 'size' of the public sector refers to the proportion of the entire economy that it
composes of,  relative to the private sector. This 'size'  can be measured in different
ways: one way, as proposed by Piketty (2014)  is to measure the total amount of tax
relative to the national income. If we were to take a global look at this evaluation, an
increase  in  this  proportion will  be  observed;  total  tax  revenues  were  less  than 10
15 There are various commodities produced by the public sector that are both rivalrous (such as a road, which if fully 
congested excludes other individuals from using it) and excludable (such as airlines, which as a function of its prices 
may exclude those who do not/cannot pay its price). However, for the purpose of this study, we think of public goods in 
its modified sense – merit goods – that may be non-excludable, but not necessarily non-rivalrous, such as education and
health facilities, both of which may be exhausted when used at point above its carrying capacity. 
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percent of national income in rich countries until 1900– 1910; they make up between
30% and 55% of national income in 2000– 2010. A stabilization of tax revenue observed
between  1980-2000,  with  not  much  scope  for  an  increment.  A  similar  method,  as
mentioned by Bagchi (2005) is to measure the proportion of government expenditure
to the GDP.   The average measure for 'advanced' countries was not more than 10%
during early 1900s and only 18% even at the time of World War 2 and but increased to
40%  by  1980s.  The  Indian  figure  was  about  9%  at  the  time  of  independence  and
doubled during the 70s and reached 25% in 80s. According to Bagchi, such an increase
raised questions about whether it was sustainable since such a trend was observed
even  when  revenue  receipts  failed  to  grow  proportionately,  resulting  in  a  large
government budget deficit.  Thus, the size of the public sector becomes of economic
concern, due to purely financial matters as well as a social interest owing to the role
the public sector plays. 
    Some questions that arise from such matters are: what would be the most optimal
allocation of resources between the public and private sectors to serve best the welfare
of the society? Since public goods are provided outside of the free market that would
otherwise have had to signal, through prices (thus leading to an absence of incentive
for consumers to reveal their preferences, or the “free-rider problem16), how does a
government or society decide upon the amount of goods to be provided by the public
sector? This implies that the expenditure of the State (to provide public goods) as well
as the tax to be collected must be jointly settled. These questions, as well as that of an
optimal  tax  rate/system  were  systematically  addressed  with  the  coming  of  the
'marginal  analysis'  towards  the  end  of  the  19th century  through  the  matching  of
consumer preferences and the cost of production of particular goods. Even a more
precise formulation for optimal government expenditure by Samuelson in his 'Pure
Theory of Public Expenditure' in 1954, followed by the entry of 'Pareto optimality', still
could not take into account the problem of unrevealed consumer preferences. For this,
Wicksell introduced an approach (which was to become the start of the theory of social
choice) which perceived the process of voting as a dummy for the bidding that takes
16 The free-rider problem is a phrase used to describe when an individual is able to take advantage of using a 
common/public good without having to pay for it. In the case of public goods, individuals that do not pay taxes are able 
to 'free-ride' by using public provisions such as national highways or defence without paying for its maintenance. 
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place  in  the  free  market.  In  this  model,  subsequent  rounds  of  voting  ensure  that
members of society 'reveal' their tax and expenditure preferences by voting for the
'package'  (political  party  or  delegate  that  represents  it).  Later,  Samuelson  also
proposed an approach by introducing a 'referee' who would know the preferences of
consumers and thereby able to meet efficiency requirements. The similarity between
the last two approaches mentioned above is that it tends to individual self-interests
and the choices that are expressed thereof. Both mechanisms merely combine all the
declared choices to provide way for decision making. The fundamental unit remains to
be the individual and their choice. 
    A contrasting approach that is briefly discussed by Bagchi (2005) is imperative to this
dissertation  and  its  underlying  rhetoric:  the  Communitarian  tradition  of  German
origin. This tradition is characterized by its focus on community and a notion of a
collective  concern,  as  opposed  to  one  that  is  individual  preference  oriented.  A
perception of society as an organic whole with shared and unified goal allows one to
make a judgement on the provision and need of public goods from an entirely distinct
view point. Examples of such a consciousness is, for example, the wish for clean and
hygienic neighbourhoods in general, or the upkeep of a national monument – both of
which are not directly  needed by an individual alone but rather,  a concern of  the
society  as  a  whole.  Musgrave  (1999)  offers  a  similar  insight  to  the  question  of
individual choice, “The state, as a cooperative venture among individuals, must reflect
their interests and concerns. Its foundation in that basic sense has to be individualistic.
At the same time, individuals do not live in isolation but are members of a group and
thereby  have  common  concerns.  Social  choices,  though  individually  based  are
conditioned by group association” (p. 32). This implies that provision of public services
will require some level of politics in order to determine policy. 
    Bagchi thus concludes that there exists a concept of group choice that arises in a
democracy  as  a  result  of  voting  and  consensus;  similar  to  Marx's  ideas  of  group
interests arising in social interaction (focusing on the capital-labour dichotomy) and
Schumpeter's ideas of social development as a result of changes in social structure,
fiscal economic decisions cannot be viewed in the absence of an acknowledgment of
social structure, and solely as individuals attempting to maximise their self interest in
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a market. Membership of an individual in a group/community is valued even though
individuals are basically the acting agents. “Self interest is not all that matters, nor can
the good society be based on it alone. Liberty, as I see it, is not to be defined as absence
of restraint  and self-centered interest  only.  Rather,  a meaningful  concept of  liberty
calls for limitations imposed by mutual concern for others.” (pg. 32) 
4.2 Why public finance?
Given the presence of the individualistic and communitarian traditions, Bagchi (2005)
states,  “A bridge between the two approaches is  sought  to  be provided by Richard
Musgrave... with the idea of 'merit goods'.” (p.7) Such goods are characterized in a way
that they are not non-rival  (and so share a feature of  private goods) but for many
reasons whose demand by society is not fully met through the market. The reality of
such a type of goods, according to Musgrave, grants the rationale for the redistributive
function of the State. The reasons for which a society will depend on its government
for  the  provision  of  public  (or  merit)  goods  are  many.  The  role  of  redistribution
through  public  goods  is  necessary  and  required  to  satisfy  a  society's  notion  of
economic justice because  Laissez-faire,  or free market operations rid of government
interventions does not always ensure efficient or Pareto optimal outcomes. Six of such
instances, as listed by Stiglitz and Rosengard (2015) are: the absence of the prerequisite
of perfect competition in realistic economies, does not allow for the satisfaction first
theorem of welfare economies,  that free market economies produce Pareto optimal
outcomes. This directly implies non-Pareto optimal results. A second matter that does
the same is the appearance of 'externalities'. The imposition of costs by one firm on
another, or other members of the society beyond or without scope for compensation
poses as an obstruction to the efficient allocation of resources because individuals that
do not bear the full cost of the negative externalities they have created will continue to
be  occupied  in  those  activities,  thereby  still  causing  costs  to  others.  Similarly,
incomplete markets and information failures, two common features of the market in
reality, also lead to Pareto inefficient results. The macroeconomic phenomena such as
unemployment, inflation and conditions of disequilibrium, featured by recessions or
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depressions often require government intervention to help the economy get back on
its feet. Finally, the sixth instance in which the government intervenes is that of public
goods. As we have already discussed, these are the goods that enjoy the features of
being  non  excludable  and  non  rivalrous,  produced  by  the  State  due  to  its  unmet
demand in the market. The characteristics mentioned above hint that the free market
is not as ideal as it is cheered out to be. Such an acknowledgement provides rationale
for government regulations and other interventions in the economy. 
     Moreover, the government may also enforce its powers to organize functions of the
market through laws of contract and right to property. The construction and increase
in size of the social State, through increased tax shares, may provide the government
with the opportunity to undertake broader social functions that what is conventional
(defense and infrastructure), such as old age security, higher education and housing
insurance. One would also see the possibility of a kind of modern redistribution of
wealth, as framed by Piketty (2014), which in place of explicitly reallocating income
from the rich to poor, arranges public services or goods that should ideally (according
to the logic of justice we explored in chapter 2 be equally accessible to all citizens.
Furthermore, the State may operate as an institution to direct action to meet collective
wants in the absence of cooperative effort from the part of individual. Since there is no
incentive for  preference revelation,  individuals  take up the  dominant  self-interest
strategy  and  fail  to  cooperate  in  that  their  actions  will  be  in  favour  of  their  own
interest, rather than an explicit effort for the good of society as a whole.17
   Thus, given the various considerations of State intervention in the form of provision
of public goods or coordinating economic production, the choice of size of the public
sector is dependant on one's outlook on the extent of impact of these roles in the lives
of the people the State governs. 
4.3 Against public finance
If  we have  so  far  attended  to  the  arguments  in  support  of  public  finance  and  its
17 One cannot generalize this claim, as there are numerous examples, in the form of social experiments (such as Fehr and 
Gächter (2002) and Bowles and Gintis (2002)) that show that cooperation can be expected when faced with common 
resources and a possibility of punishment. 
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growth,  there  are  just  as  many  opposing  arguments  to  it.  One  such  claim  is  that
excessive government expenditure will prove to be damaging to its own functioning,
elaborated  in  The  Elgar  Companion  to  Classical  Economics  by  Kurz  and  Salvadori
(1998).  Since  any  mode  of  government  expenditure  is  funded  through  taxes  (and
borrowing), a rise in expenditure will require and push for the expansion and increase
in taxes. Such a development is believed to both destroy the finances of producers as
well as discourage productivity of businesses, since firms that are increasingly taxed
on their production and revenue will bottle their operations. 
    The sequence of “destruction” (pg 345) had been observed as early as 1377 by the
Arab historian Ibn Khaldun. In his  The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History,  Ibn
Khaldun goes on to elaborate his observations regarding the shrinking tax base. First,
the proposition that government expenditure has a tendency to grow faster than the
tax base and no benefit to the tax base is put forward. To match this expenditure, the
State will need to levy increased taxes on commerce. This will have a negative impact
on the incentive to produce, or decline in business effort, which consequently results
in the slump of commercial or taxable activity. To escape this situation, citizens move
out of the region, leaving it in ruins. Thus, a government's increase in expenditure or
the increase in its taxing of citizens has both direct and indirect effects on the future of
the nation's prosperity. 
    Kurz  and  Salvadori  (1998)  also  Quesnay  also  saw  danger  in  increased  public
expenditure  if  it  was  financed  from  any  other  source  other  than  the  economy's
surplus:
The tax should not be destructive or disproportionate to the mass of the nation's
revenue; that their increase should follow the increase in revenue; and that they
should be laid directly on the net product of landed property, and not on men's
wages, or on produce, where they would increase the costs of collection, operate
to  the  detriment  of  trade,  and  destroy  every  year  a  portion  of  the  nation's
wealth...
Kurz & Salvadori, 1998: 346
35
It is claimed that taxes on the income of farmers would lead to deterioration of land,
and that on labourers as well as commodities would result in a cost of collection of tax
that exceeds the tax revenue itself. Quesnay also believed that some pubic expenditure
was indeed productive, but if financed inappropriately would not be worth the decline
of the state that would be a consequent outcome. Adam Smith, like Quesnay made the
distinction between productive and unproductive labour (productive being that which
produced economic surplus), but only considered agricultural activity as productive
labour, whose surplus can be added to the capital stock to support both productive and
unproductive workers for the coming year.  
    Kurz and Salvadori (1998) write that in Smith's understanding, a cause of economic
decline could be if an economy is dominated by unproductive labour. Smith claims
that  it  is  rarely  the  private  units  that  impoverish  a  nation  but  public
actions/expenditure  that  maintain  unproductive  workers.  If  this  maintenance
encourages  the  reproduction  of  such  members,  increasing  the  number  that  is
dependant on productive labour, it is likely that a greater share of the produce would
be  consumed  by  them,  leaving  insufficient  produce  for  the  maintenance  of  the
productive labour force. Smith further explains that while public expenditure might
be able to push a nation into trouble, the activities of the private firms or families
(through the accumulation of capital) will continue to support and increase the wealth
of the nation. However, Smith does admit the productivity of some govt expenditure
such as that on ports and other components of  a nation's  infrastructure as well  as
education. 
    Smith's Scottish predecessor, Steuart, further claimed that taxes were generally too
low to bring forth a country's productive potential. In fact, he also suggests that taxes
discourage idleness and that taxing in order to spend was a way by which economic
welfare could be increased - ‘Taxes and impositions in their hands, are the wealth of
the  father  of  the  family;  who  therewith  feeds,  clothes,  provides  for,  and  defends
everyone within his house’ (Kurz and Salvadori, 1998, pg. 349) Steuart also particularly
felt that public expenditure funded by taxing would improve the infrastructure in the
long term. 
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  Another  argument  against  increased  government  expenditure  stems  from  the
popular belief that politicians and bureaucrats are untrustworthy and self-interested –
that national resources in the public sector is, “... inherently wasteful, and detrimental
to economic growth and social welfare.” (Bagchi, 2005. p. 491) There is also a question
of the authenticity or ability of a government to ensure a representation of preferences
such that the policies chosen will produce the highest levels of welfare possible. This
not only implies an apprehension towards majoritarianism in public policy making
but also the very nature of politics at the decision making levels. 
    Poterba (1998) offers some insight on the political factors that influence the choice of
tax systems. Stigler and others from the 'Chicago school'  in the year 1971 introduced
models that presented instances where self-interested 'regulators' chose policy on the
basis of the transfer of rent offered by special interest groups. In other words, it was
argued that well organized or well financed industry groups could persuade regulators
away from efficient policies to ones that generated rents for these groups. In this way,
the importance of  policy formation itself  is  considered, in order to move from the
analysis of efficiency costs to evaluating political factors that drove regulatory policy. 
    Poterba presents a model by Winer and Hettich (1998) that evaluate the effect of
political considerations on tax systems in representative democracies by modifying the
neoclassical optimal tax model with the introduction of a self interested politician in
place of the benevolent social planner. This politician will effectively attempt to equate
the  marginal  political  cost  per  dollar  of  revenue raised from different  methods  of
policy instead of the marginal efficiency cost, in other words, some kind of political
calculation will take place prior to decision making in policy, considering variables like
vote banks, interest groups and election funds. Such a model suggests a move away
from economically efficient tax systems. Poterba further claims that this, “...expands
the  traditional  public  finance  dialogue  regarding  tax  efficiency  to  allow  for  the
possibility that “political market failures” result in politically inefficient policies.” (pg
393)
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4.4 Equity vs. efficiency – a tradeoff?
Various instances in both chapters 3 and 4 have hinted upon an apparent bargain that
policy makers must make between equity and efficiency prior to a decision regarding
State schemes or policies. The standard objection to progressive rates of corporate or
income  tax  is  that  it  will  lead  to  the  lowering  of  economic  output  and  hindering
economic growth, owing to the 'misallocation' of resources, leading to an impact on
efficiency.  A  response  to  this  objection  has  been  put  forward  by  Atkinson  (2015):
Firstly, it need not be that we as a society, prefer the proverbial cake to be larger than
to be justly  shared.  Given some rationale of  redistributive justice (as elaborated in
chapter 2), we may indeed prioritize equity over any idea of economic efficiency or
growth.  Moreover,  it  is  not  true  that  all  proposals  involving  an increase in public
finance will lessen the size of the cake. It is entirely possible that various interventions
by the government, fiscal or production and organizational in nature (provisions of the
public sector) enhance economic conduct. Some basic examples are: provision of free
or subsidized health and education act as improvements to the nation's human capital,
compared to the cases that the lower income brackets of society are unable to afford
these facilities. Musgrave (1999) refers to ideal of distributive justice and rightly insists
that:
A view of fiscal economics which holds that all is well if only Pareto optimality
prevails, bypasses these essential components of social coexistence and fails on
both normative and positive grounds.  Without  allowing for  a  sense of  social
justice the good society cannot be defined, and without it  democratic  society
cannot function.
                                                                        Musgrave, 1999: 32
Finally, it is worth noting that the theory that guarantees Pareto optimal outcomes –
the first  theorem of welfare economics – is  based on the unrealistic  assumption of
perfect  competition.  The  assumptions  of  perfect  competition,  or  sets  of  markets
38
equalizing the supply and demand curves on its graph, and perfect information does
not hold in markets outside of Varian textbooks, as was elaborated in the section on
market failures. Therefore, even if we were to prioritize efficiency over equity, we still
do not have an assured alternative of pareto or socially optimal outcomes in the case
that public finance is limited. 
    Thus,  we  require  a  modification  of  our  current  tradeoff  between  equity  and
efficiency.  This  can  be  done  by  reassigning  appropriates  weights  to  each  after
considering relevant ideas such as the spirit of redistributive justice, the implication
and probability of genuine Pareto efficient outcomes as well as a fine reflection upon




As  mentioned  in  the  introduction  of  this  study,  economic  philosophy  attempts  to
conceptualize and explain the relations between economic theories and the reality of
norms or ethical values in society, thereby studying the dynamic between the two in
the  process  of  economic  reasoning.  This  research  has  attempted  to  explore  this
dynamic in the context of public finance, particularly regarding matters concerning
fiscal policies.
    Chapter 1 presented ideas regarding the role of the State, the reality of inequality
and other ethical considerations regarding who to tax how much; a conclusion was
reached that an important role of the State is to correct historical social injustice by the
means of redistributive measures through taxation, the design of which ought to be
progressive in nature alongside the with provision of public goods that are accessible
to  all.  Chapter  2  surveyed  various  concepts  from  the  neoclassical  microeconomic
framework to analyse the effects of taxation in a perfectly competitive market, and
contained an elaborate review of the critique of efficiency and Pareto optimality used
as a yardstick for whether a tax system is desirable. I conclude that the heavy reliance
on Pareto optimality is problematic; the absence of perfect competition, a requirement
for the fulfilment of the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics, thereby is
unable to guarantee pareto optimal outcomes in the real world. Moreover, another
practical deficiency of the concept of Pareto optimality is its inability to account for
concerns regarding equity. Thus, this calls for third party intervention (in the form of
the State), with the use of fiscal policies and public expenditure to fill the gaps in an
economy  in  order  to  ensure  welfare  to  all  people.  Finally,  chapter  3  surveyed
arguments for and against State intervention, regarding the role and size of the public
sector, as well as thoughts on public financing in a nation. I conclude that the public
provision of  goods and services  serve various  purposes;  in  the  context  of  unequal
socio-economic opportunities of a society, it responds to the necessity of commodities
that are accessible to all.
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     With the content of the three chapters, I string together pieces of the reasoning that
takes  place  prior  to  a  fiscal  policy  decision.  Public  expenditure,  together  with
progressive  types  of  taxation,  behaves  as  a  modern-day  method  of  redistributing
income and wealth in a society. By doing this, the State thereby fulfils its duty in a
contractarian venture by acting upon shared concerns of a society, one of which in this
case is economic justice. However, with the consideration of economic concepts such
as deadweight loss and Pareto optimality as a measure of welfare of the members of a
society, there seems to be a tug of war between equity and efficiency, both ideas crucial
to any economy. Here, I challenge the application of Pareto optimality as the golden
rule for decision making in public finance owing to its various deficiencies. This is not
to  say  that  Pareto  efficiency  should  not  be  aimed  for,  but,  that  arguments  against
government intervention in the form of progressive taxation and increased levels of
public expenditure based on the desire for Pareto optimality are disadvantageous to
society. Some of these deficiencies are: the benefits of Pareto optimal outcomes, as per
the first fundamental theorem of welfare, lie in an assumed perfectly competitive state
of the market. Such an assumption discounts various components of economic reality
such  as  unemployment,  externalities,  monopolies,  oligopolies  and  information
asymmetries; thus, even in the case that Pareto optimality is the priority, it would still
not be guaranteed in the economies that we are part of in reality. Additionally, there is
a stark difference between the context in which Pareto's optimality was introduced
and  its  application  today  –  Pareto's  conceptualization  of  ophelimity  describes  a
condition  of  competitive  equilibrium,  a  measure  that  is  divorced  from  normative
claims of any kind; on the other hand, the measure is now being used as a desired
norm. This means that the concept and its use fails on both positive and normative
grounds.  Moreover,  the  quest  for  Pareto  optimality  lacks  any  consideration of  the
relative  inequality  between  individuals,  or  the  structural  socio-economic
discrimination that may hinder equal accessibility to various commodities, had they
not been publicly provided (such as rationed grain, education, health facilities, etc). In
other  words,  there  seems  to  be  a  disconnect  between the  socio-political  reality  of
society  and  the  narrow  'economic'  modelling  of  it.  Borrowing  from  the  works  of
McCloskey  (1985),  a  scholar's  (or,  in  this  case,  a  policy  maker's)  intuition  and
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consideration of social norms is a move towards the direction of rationally arguing like
human  beings  and  away  from  the  narrow  (by  the  neoclassical  methodology  of
explaining social phenomena) range of criteria that claim economic truth. 
   To illustrate the issues with policy makers relying on the Pareto optimality as the
benchmark  for  good  policy,  I  present  the  infamous  internal  memo  written  by
Lawrence Summers in 1991, the then chief economist of the World Bank:
I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-
wage  country  is  impeccable  and  we  should  face  up  to  that...  The  costs  of
pollution  are  likely  to  be  non-linear  as  the  initial  increments  of  pollution
probably  have  very  low  cost...  I’ve  always  thought  that  under-populated
countries in Africa are vastly under polluted; their air quality is probably vastly
in efficiently low compared to Los Angeles or Mexico City. Only the lamentable
facts that so much pollution is generated by non-tradable industries (transport,
electrical generation) and that the unit transport costs of solid waste are so high
prevent world-welfare-enhancing trade in air pollution and waste.
                                        Hausman, McPherson & Satz, 2016: 13
While it is claimed (Hausman, D., McPherson, M., & Satz, D. 2016) that Summers had
written  this  memorandum  as  a  “provocative  exploration  of  the  implications  of
“economic logic” rather than as a serious proposal for a World Bank program to export
pollution  to  the  LDCs”  (p.  13),  in  1992,  Brazil's  Secretary  of  Environment,  Jose
Lutzenberger  wrote  to  Summers,  “Your  reasoning  is  perfectly  logical  but  totally
insane... Your thoughts [provide] a concrete example of the unbelievable alienation,
reductionist  thinking,  social  ruthlessness  and  the  arrogant  ignorance  of  many
conventional 'economists' concerning the nature of the world we live in” (Adler, M.
2013. p. 44)
    Thus, due consideration is to be given to observations of the social world, inclusive
of ethics and normative notions, in order to achieve the closest truth that one may
confidently depend on for the purposes of policy making.
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